Tom Hayden seeks to destroy Democrats
He thinks he is attempting to block US efforts in Iraq, but in fact he's the Republicans' friend by driving Jacksonian Democrats over to GOP.
Sunday, November 28, 2004
Thursday, November 25, 2004
The UN stock plumets and plumets
Claudia Rosett has been uncovering the story on Oil for Food for some time now. See the continuing coverage in her column at Opinion Journal. But it gets worse for the UN. Belmont Club has quite a round up. The first five links are on the sexual abuse scandal which is much wider than the Congo, and seems to stretch wherever there is peacekeeping. Next is a link to Diplomad on the corrupt nature of the UN. Diplomad concludes "It's time for the US and other serious countries (e.g., Australia, Israel) to get out of the UN." Glenn Reynolds replies, "Or to replace Kofi Annan with Vaclav Havel!" Some wonder whether the UN is fixable. Others worry that in its absence, other more pernicious leagues might fill the vacuum.
Claudia Rosett has been uncovering the story on Oil for Food for some time now. See the continuing coverage in her column at Opinion Journal. But it gets worse for the UN. Belmont Club has quite a round up. The first five links are on the sexual abuse scandal which is much wider than the Congo, and seems to stretch wherever there is peacekeeping. Next is a link to Diplomad on the corrupt nature of the UN. Diplomad concludes "It's time for the US and other serious countries (e.g., Australia, Israel) to get out of the UN." Glenn Reynolds replies, "Or to replace Kofi Annan with Vaclav Havel!" Some wonder whether the UN is fixable. Others worry that in its absence, other more pernicious leagues might fill the vacuum.
Monday, November 22, 2004
Aristotle's Guide to Powerpoint
One of the problems with publishing software and powerpoint is that for many, our reach exceeds our grasp. The result is a document or presentation that is too busy, confusing, or dominated by flash. Look, therefore, to Aristotle's 10 powerpoint tips at Beyond Bullet.
http://www.beyondbullets.com/2004/08/99_perspiration.html
One of the problems with publishing software and powerpoint is that for many, our reach exceeds our grasp. The result is a document or presentation that is too busy, confusing, or dominated by flash. Look, therefore, to Aristotle's 10 powerpoint tips at Beyond Bullet.
http://www.beyondbullets.com/2004/08/99_perspiration.html
Sunday, November 21, 2004
Battle of the Bad Acts
Among yesterday's posts, I argued that even where we support an American serviceman who appears to be defending his unit against dirty tricks, we cannot abandon the principle of the rules of war. I would draw your attention to two posts by IraqPundit, an Iraqi exile commenting on affairs back home. Two weeks ago IraqPundit observed that that the Western media ignore attacks by the terrorists against everyone except Westerners, especially nationals of the media's home country. The far more numerous attacks by terrorists against the Iraqis themselves are ignored, except insomuch as they suggest the Allawi government is being attacked. Yesterday, IraqPundit criticized the favorable terms that characterize Western media coverage of the terrorists in a post titled "Cunning and Resolute". The author notes, "Anyway, the Times of London has given us a reality check, a glimpse of Fallujah under the rule of these cunning and resolute heroes: 'Mutilated bodies dumped on Fallujah's bombed out streets today painted a harrowing picture of eight months of rebel rule.'"
So I return to my point of yesterday. In a world where the media will prevent the terrorists in a glow of soft light in the West and in propogandistic terms in the Mideast itself, the war for Iraq is a battle over the presentation of bad acts. The terrorists commit them all the time, but they are ignored by the media. Americans will make a few mistakes, but these will be exagerated and replayed constantly. Niel Gabler on Fox Newswatch described the defining pictoral moment of the Iraq War not as the statue of Saddam being toppled, but of Abu Ghraib. Jane Hall on the same show observed that Al Jazzera was playing the Marine in the mosque video three times an hour.
I argued in June, much of these attacks are aimed at frightening the Iraqis themselves. These bad acts on both sides are not portrayed in context or fairly. But the key here is how Iraqis themselves make these things out. The media, theirs and ours, want to portray the Coallition as the same as the Terrorists. Anyone who believes that, there or here, would surely be inclined against the American effort.
I conclude with this statement made by IraqPundit two weeks ago: "Such stories lead readers to conclude that Iraqis are safe in their homes, unless they are killed by either U.S. soldiers or some other clumsy bombing. Iraqis trying to surive the war against them know that the truth is a lot more complicated. Iraqi civilians are aware of the killings of Americans and others, and are horrified. Why aren't American journalists and critics of the war similarly concerned about the horrors -- including kidnappings and killings -- faced daily by Iraqi civilians?"
Among yesterday's posts, I argued that even where we support an American serviceman who appears to be defending his unit against dirty tricks, we cannot abandon the principle of the rules of war. I would draw your attention to two posts by IraqPundit, an Iraqi exile commenting on affairs back home. Two weeks ago IraqPundit observed that that the Western media ignore attacks by the terrorists against everyone except Westerners, especially nationals of the media's home country. The far more numerous attacks by terrorists against the Iraqis themselves are ignored, except insomuch as they suggest the Allawi government is being attacked. Yesterday, IraqPundit criticized the favorable terms that characterize Western media coverage of the terrorists in a post titled "Cunning and Resolute". The author notes, "Anyway, the Times of London has given us a reality check, a glimpse of Fallujah under the rule of these cunning and resolute heroes: 'Mutilated bodies dumped on Fallujah's bombed out streets today painted a harrowing picture of eight months of rebel rule.'"
So I return to my point of yesterday. In a world where the media will prevent the terrorists in a glow of soft light in the West and in propogandistic terms in the Mideast itself, the war for Iraq is a battle over the presentation of bad acts. The terrorists commit them all the time, but they are ignored by the media. Americans will make a few mistakes, but these will be exagerated and replayed constantly. Niel Gabler on Fox Newswatch described the defining pictoral moment of the Iraq War not as the statue of Saddam being toppled, but of Abu Ghraib. Jane Hall on the same show observed that Al Jazzera was playing the Marine in the mosque video three times an hour.
I argued in June, much of these attacks are aimed at frightening the Iraqis themselves. These bad acts on both sides are not portrayed in context or fairly. But the key here is how Iraqis themselves make these things out. The media, theirs and ours, want to portray the Coallition as the same as the Terrorists. Anyone who believes that, there or here, would surely be inclined against the American effort.
I conclude with this statement made by IraqPundit two weeks ago: "Such stories lead readers to conclude that Iraqis are safe in their homes, unless they are killed by either U.S. soldiers or some other clumsy bombing. Iraqis trying to surive the war against them know that the truth is a lot more complicated. Iraqi civilians are aware of the killings of Americans and others, and are horrified. Why aren't American journalists and critics of the war similarly concerned about the horrors -- including kidnappings and killings -- faced daily by Iraqi civilians?"
Army Transformation to fight Terrorism
The Army has long given serious thought to terrorism, what is it, why is it effective, and how to fight it. Though it didn't really gain the coinage as terrorism (rival terms are more common at other times) until recent decades, low intensity warfare as been a constant concern for thinkers in the Army and Marines. While the Small Wars Manual and the weight of history certainly favor the Marines in devising ways to fight Terrorism and Guerilla wars, the Army has simply the bulk of resources in the form of war colleges to devote to this form of land warfare, and its done somewhat more thinking on the nature of Terrorism. The Army's failure to keep pace with the Marines in implementation of these ideas is based on the Marines superior experience and the Army's otherwise laudable focus on the main threat facing American security, a major land war with the Soviets. One need look no farther than Vietnam to see how this has left the Marines in a much, much better place to run that war. Still the Army had people who understood how to fight that war, mostly in their war colleges and in various special forces units.
The problem facing the Army is how to transform itself from a main battle force designed to confront a superpower in Central Europe, to one capable of fighting the War on Terror and otherwise specializing in fighting low intensity wars. This problem is what makes Rumsfeld the essential man at the Pentagon. My fear is that there is no one else with the combination of the right vision and the ability to compel the military establishment as Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense web site starts off with a link on the War on Terror, but right after that is a link called "Transformation." That strikes me about right.
Westmoreland and Abrams were good soldiers who both fought as armored commanders in World War II. Had a war in Central Europe occured, they would have commanded armored divsions and mechanized corps with skill and great ability. That they were called upon to command in Vietnam is the mistake of others. Senior officers generally seek to fight the last war, to make the best of lessons learned, and avoid taking risks with radically new ideas or technology. Even some young officers I have spoken with have warned against too much transformation, and would prefer to leave the army a heavy main battle force. Before World War II theorists could be found advocating a radical new kind of war that would make the trench obsolete. Some spoke of the stormtrooper tactics, others of machine guns, still others of high level bombers, and yet others of tanks, submarines, or missiles. None were entirely wrong, but those advocated for tanks were more right than most. Combining tanks, close support aircraft, and mobile infantry to encircle enemy formations wasn't nearly as obvious in 1936 as it was in 1946. Doing it effectively was the trick.
The War on Terror will require some new vision, new tactics, applying and summoning forth new technology, and will draw on some experiences of military history (other low intensity wars) while drawing only most generally on the whole of military history. Kursk 1943 is not the place to start. The Philippines 1903 would be a far more reasonable place. This won't happen by itself. Compelling the old soldiers to abandon learned lessons will be hard, embracing a new doctrine will produce anxiety, advocates of alternative doctrines will snipe, changes will harm old constituencies before new ones are built to defend the new way.
Some of these new things may require a larger role for special forces, and so they may need to expand, but I think the bulk of the changes will involve using the familiar rifleman in new ways and under new conditions. For example, the support of precision guided weapons is probabaly as profound as the development of close air support was sixty plus years ago. Utilizing new communications and computer speeds will make new kinds of actions possible. I suspect the new kind of war won't look radically different: we won't abandon armor or shift way over to special forces. Nor will we need the Crusader, new heavy tanks, or other slow, heavy machines.
After Afghanistan and Iraq, as the Army moves forward, it needs to study the lessons of these campaigns and conciously look back to the campaigns of its own, and especially the Marines' small wars experience. In the meantime, as the Army moves forward with its transformation, don't kill the old doctrines, just shelve them. Thinkers in the war colleges will be anticipating the kinds of wars new enemies might require. Who these new enemies are or what kind of wars they will fight remains a mystery. Like the planners of the 1920's and 1930's who contemplated wars against all the major powers, a variety of ideas were developed and ultimatly found their way into the final war plans of World War II.
The Army has long given serious thought to terrorism, what is it, why is it effective, and how to fight it. Though it didn't really gain the coinage as terrorism (rival terms are more common at other times) until recent decades, low intensity warfare as been a constant concern for thinkers in the Army and Marines. While the Small Wars Manual and the weight of history certainly favor the Marines in devising ways to fight Terrorism and Guerilla wars, the Army has simply the bulk of resources in the form of war colleges to devote to this form of land warfare, and its done somewhat more thinking on the nature of Terrorism. The Army's failure to keep pace with the Marines in implementation of these ideas is based on the Marines superior experience and the Army's otherwise laudable focus on the main threat facing American security, a major land war with the Soviets. One need look no farther than Vietnam to see how this has left the Marines in a much, much better place to run that war. Still the Army had people who understood how to fight that war, mostly in their war colleges and in various special forces units.
The problem facing the Army is how to transform itself from a main battle force designed to confront a superpower in Central Europe, to one capable of fighting the War on Terror and otherwise specializing in fighting low intensity wars. This problem is what makes Rumsfeld the essential man at the Pentagon. My fear is that there is no one else with the combination of the right vision and the ability to compel the military establishment as Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense web site starts off with a link on the War on Terror, but right after that is a link called "Transformation." That strikes me about right.
Westmoreland and Abrams were good soldiers who both fought as armored commanders in World War II. Had a war in Central Europe occured, they would have commanded armored divsions and mechanized corps with skill and great ability. That they were called upon to command in Vietnam is the mistake of others. Senior officers generally seek to fight the last war, to make the best of lessons learned, and avoid taking risks with radically new ideas or technology. Even some young officers I have spoken with have warned against too much transformation, and would prefer to leave the army a heavy main battle force. Before World War II theorists could be found advocating a radical new kind of war that would make the trench obsolete. Some spoke of the stormtrooper tactics, others of machine guns, still others of high level bombers, and yet others of tanks, submarines, or missiles. None were entirely wrong, but those advocated for tanks were more right than most. Combining tanks, close support aircraft, and mobile infantry to encircle enemy formations wasn't nearly as obvious in 1936 as it was in 1946. Doing it effectively was the trick.
The War on Terror will require some new vision, new tactics, applying and summoning forth new technology, and will draw on some experiences of military history (other low intensity wars) while drawing only most generally on the whole of military history. Kursk 1943 is not the place to start. The Philippines 1903 would be a far more reasonable place. This won't happen by itself. Compelling the old soldiers to abandon learned lessons will be hard, embracing a new doctrine will produce anxiety, advocates of alternative doctrines will snipe, changes will harm old constituencies before new ones are built to defend the new way.
Some of these new things may require a larger role for special forces, and so they may need to expand, but I think the bulk of the changes will involve using the familiar rifleman in new ways and under new conditions. For example, the support of precision guided weapons is probabaly as profound as the development of close air support was sixty plus years ago. Utilizing new communications and computer speeds will make new kinds of actions possible. I suspect the new kind of war won't look radically different: we won't abandon armor or shift way over to special forces. Nor will we need the Crusader, new heavy tanks, or other slow, heavy machines.
After Afghanistan and Iraq, as the Army moves forward, it needs to study the lessons of these campaigns and conciously look back to the campaigns of its own, and especially the Marines' small wars experience. In the meantime, as the Army moves forward with its transformation, don't kill the old doctrines, just shelve them. Thinkers in the war colleges will be anticipating the kinds of wars new enemies might require. Who these new enemies are or what kind of wars they will fight remains a mystery. Like the planners of the 1920's and 1930's who contemplated wars against all the major powers, a variety of ideas were developed and ultimatly found their way into the final war plans of World War II.
War on Terror outside of Mideast
Some, such as Dennis Prager, argue the so-called war on terror is mis-named, because its a war on radical Islam. I disagree. I contend that terrorism was the method of war of the international communist movement during detente, supporting, training, and encouraging their leftist allies in the so-called third world. I like the phrase the war on terror and I don't want to see the concern limited to the Mideast. There are terrorists globally, and they have long aided one another, trained one another, and cooperated. Its essential to wage war on all terrorists in all places according to priorities established by policy. Certianly that makes the Mideast the central front in the War on Terror, but here is some good news on other fronts.
Rummy praises Canal security in Panama.
Rummy Urges a Latin Push Against Terror
Asst SecDef for Low Intensity Warfare on Columbia
Defense Ministerial of the Americas vow Unity in fight on Terror
Not surprisingly, those who prefer to capitulate to terror are concerned. More concern here.
Some, such as Dennis Prager, argue the so-called war on terror is mis-named, because its a war on radical Islam. I disagree. I contend that terrorism was the method of war of the international communist movement during detente, supporting, training, and encouraging their leftist allies in the so-called third world. I like the phrase the war on terror and I don't want to see the concern limited to the Mideast. There are terrorists globally, and they have long aided one another, trained one another, and cooperated. Its essential to wage war on all terrorists in all places according to priorities established by policy. Certianly that makes the Mideast the central front in the War on Terror, but here is some good news on other fronts.
Rummy praises Canal security in Panama.
Rummy Urges a Latin Push Against Terror
Asst SecDef for Low Intensity Warfare on Columbia
Defense Ministerial of the Americas vow Unity in fight on Terror
Not surprisingly, those who prefer to capitulate to terror are concerned. More concern here.
Pistons Pacers Brawl
How long should Ron Artest and Stephen Jackson be suspended? For ever. These guys are service providers who attacked their customers. Don't you fire the cashier who attacks the customer? Do you give a couple of days without pay to a desk clerk who punches a guest? These are service workers who engaged in criminal acts of violence against the people they are their to entertain. If it were the usher at the cinema, he's out on his ear. So to athletes who charge the stands and hit people.
How long should Ron Artest and Stephen Jackson be suspended? For ever. These guys are service providers who attacked their customers. Don't you fire the cashier who attacks the customer? Do you give a couple of days without pay to a desk clerk who punches a guest? These are service workers who engaged in criminal acts of violence against the people they are their to entertain. If it were the usher at the cinema, he's out on his ear. So to athletes who charge the stands and hit people.
Saturday, November 20, 2004
Target/Salvation Army Contraversy
Regretable, but inevitable. Target can't open its storefront to speech from party A, but deny speech from party B. They either have to open the space they grant to one party to all parties, or restrict it entirely. As long as no one asserts their rights, someone like Target can maintain de facto content discrimination (rejecting speech on the basis of content), but someone has come along to demand their spot on the stage. Actually many someones: "We receive an increasing number of solicitation inquiries from non-profit organizations each year and determined that if we continue to allow the Salvation Army to solicit then it opens the door to other groups that wish to solicit our guests."
Hugh Hewitt is not happy about it, but James Lileks regards it as the way of the world.
Objections seem to break down into two groups, the "they do good work" school of thought and the "they're a holiday fixture" school of thought." The first school seems to be tainted by fears that this is some kind of anti-Christain bias. The second school is tainted by a dissatisfaction with the way corporations run the public space. The solution is simple, if the public wants more old-time public spaces, they need to create and use them. Otherwise this whole thing amounts to no more than nostalgia.
Regretable, but inevitable. Target can't open its storefront to speech from party A, but deny speech from party B. They either have to open the space they grant to one party to all parties, or restrict it entirely. As long as no one asserts their rights, someone like Target can maintain de facto content discrimination (rejecting speech on the basis of content), but someone has come along to demand their spot on the stage. Actually many someones: "We receive an increasing number of solicitation inquiries from non-profit organizations each year and determined that if we continue to allow the Salvation Army to solicit then it opens the door to other groups that wish to solicit our guests."
Hugh Hewitt is not happy about it, but James Lileks regards it as the way of the world.
Objections seem to break down into two groups, the "they do good work" school of thought and the "they're a holiday fixture" school of thought." The first school seems to be tainted by fears that this is some kind of anti-Christain bias. The second school is tainted by a dissatisfaction with the way corporations run the public space. The solution is simple, if the public wants more old-time public spaces, they need to create and use them. Otherwise this whole thing amounts to no more than nostalgia.
The Fallujah Marine and War Crimes
There are plenty of people ready to give the Marine who killed a wounded fellow in a mosque a pass because our guys should never be exposed to any risk more than absolutly neccesary. But given the American military power is overwhelming and that this keeps our guys safer, its not unreasonable that we seek to restrain ourselves from doing any more harm than in neccesary to accomplish our mission. This sets up a conflict between those who seek to minimize harm to our troops and those who seek to minimize harm to innocents, which is made more difficult because the enemy seeks to use innocents to shield them from harm. Of course the proper approach is to give both principles respect, and not just advocate for protection of only the troops or only the innocents. Only protecting the troops leads to unneccesary harm to innocents by negligence, which is wrong. Only protecting the innocent empowers those, like terrorists, willing to violate the same principle. The shooting in question did take place in a mosque, after all. Clinton era legal constraints of many kinds tended to put too many restrictions on US intelligence and military action. But the princple of legal restraint, that is the notion of war crimes, should not be thrown out because some enemy has decided to ignore them. Too many statements supporting the marine seem to come from the "worried mom" school of engagement, which is kill anything that my harm my darling boy.
Wars like the War on Terror, as fought in Iraq and Afghanistan are more political than they are military. Indeed, one could say more political, social, and economic than military. Suppose the reputation of Americans was such that it was supposed that a fleeing terrorist fell down while fleeing, we'd help him up, give him his weapon back and give him a count of ten to get back to his fellows. Would the average Iraqi be more inclined to favor the guy who hides in mosques and lays roadside bombs and blows up civilian services, or the Americans? Now we should not be handing back the weapons of terrorists who fall down, but neither should we be shooting the unarmed and fallen.
See the last paragraph of this NRO article by Mackubin Thomas Owens.
There are plenty of people ready to give the Marine who killed a wounded fellow in a mosque a pass because our guys should never be exposed to any risk more than absolutly neccesary. But given the American military power is overwhelming and that this keeps our guys safer, its not unreasonable that we seek to restrain ourselves from doing any more harm than in neccesary to accomplish our mission. This sets up a conflict between those who seek to minimize harm to our troops and those who seek to minimize harm to innocents, which is made more difficult because the enemy seeks to use innocents to shield them from harm. Of course the proper approach is to give both principles respect, and not just advocate for protection of only the troops or only the innocents. Only protecting the troops leads to unneccesary harm to innocents by negligence, which is wrong. Only protecting the innocent empowers those, like terrorists, willing to violate the same principle. The shooting in question did take place in a mosque, after all. Clinton era legal constraints of many kinds tended to put too many restrictions on US intelligence and military action. But the princple of legal restraint, that is the notion of war crimes, should not be thrown out because some enemy has decided to ignore them. Too many statements supporting the marine seem to come from the "worried mom" school of engagement, which is kill anything that my harm my darling boy.
Wars like the War on Terror, as fought in Iraq and Afghanistan are more political than they are military. Indeed, one could say more political, social, and economic than military. Suppose the reputation of Americans was such that it was supposed that a fleeing terrorist fell down while fleeing, we'd help him up, give him his weapon back and give him a count of ten to get back to his fellows. Would the average Iraqi be more inclined to favor the guy who hides in mosques and lays roadside bombs and blows up civilian services, or the Americans? Now we should not be handing back the weapons of terrorists who fall down, but neither should we be shooting the unarmed and fallen.
See the last paragraph of this NRO article by Mackubin Thomas Owens.
Sunday, November 14, 2004
More on Coalitions
The guy who has really been running the ball on the question of a governing party is Hugh Hewitt. His November 11th piece for the Weekly Standard focuses on Arlen Specter, but makes the point well.
The guy who has really been running the ball on the question of a governing party is Hugh Hewitt. His November 11th piece for the Weekly Standard focuses on Arlen Specter, but makes the point well.
The blog Power and Control makes the point, "Voting coalitions are ruled by the least committed members. So the question to the cultural conservatives is: do you want 2004 to be the Republican high water mark or would you like to extend the string."
Some cultural conservatives reply, "So if cultural conservatives would just give up on the main issue which keeps them in the Republican Party, then the GOP would enjoy a longer period of political control in Washington?If you put yourself in the culturecon's shoes, you have to ask yourself 'What's the point?!' If the party doesn't fight for what really matters to you, why should you give a flip about the party's success?"
Sort answers include,
1) incremental wins
2) preventing the other side from doing worse things
3) the ability to create spaces where your wing of the party gets to advance its agenda (much easier in a federalist system than a unitary one)
What Power and Control's author understands is that parties are coalitions. Diverse groups of (yet still further diverse individuals) interests working together to advance more of their agenda then they could with any other likely coalition. Some members of coalitions are loose. That is they cross over frequently to the other side, but remain affiliated with the coalition. Some members are not affiliated, but justed the coalition just because the agenda appealed more (possibly every so slightly more) than the other agenda. Let's also make allowances for external circumstances, such as family party affiliation, past party affiliation, geography, and so forth. The more you look into it, the more parties are just vessels for interests to organize and have no particular ideology themselves. This is one of the reasons that parties can swap ideology.
The social conservative view represented in Power and Control's comments goes on to say, "If you really believe that the Republican Party is a coalition, then I would remind you that coalition partners are in a coalition to further their own interests, not those of their fellow members. And it is very important for you to remember this: if you sacrifice the objectives of one of your constituencies, don't count on that constituency being very committed."
Coalitions who don't cooperate on the interests of other coalition members, but only seek their own agenda are not effective coalitions. Coalition partners who don't understand that they have to compromise with other partners are hurting their coalition. There is no interest that can govern by itself. Only coalitions of interests can govern.
People who put a socially conservative agenda at the top of their concerns are not a majority of the Republican coalition and are a minority of the Democratic coalition. This means they need to comprimise with enough moderates to get something rather than nothing. Its clear that some people would rather get nothing and remain ideologically pure, than to get some thing now and possibly impress a larger number with the success of this policy. Education reform has traditionally be very incremental drawing on the huge numbers of local programs out there. No one gets 100% of what they want in education.
Too many people who share their opinions with a quarter or less of the American people get mad that they can't get their will imposed on the whole country. When people on the other side hear this frustration, or maybe just hear the agenda, come to the conclusion that the "religious right wants to impose its values on the country." The frustrating thing about this is that its the result of people generalizing from a small group of people who don't understand politics.
Parties are effective when they advance a broad agenda with the cooperation of most of the coalition on each point of the agenda.
Some cultural conservatives reply, "So if cultural conservatives would just give up on the main issue which keeps them in the Republican Party, then the GOP would enjoy a longer period of political control in Washington?If you put yourself in the culturecon's shoes, you have to ask yourself 'What's the point?!' If the party doesn't fight for what really matters to you, why should you give a flip about the party's success?"
Sort answers include,
1) incremental wins
2) preventing the other side from doing worse things
3) the ability to create spaces where your wing of the party gets to advance its agenda (much easier in a federalist system than a unitary one)
What Power and Control's author understands is that parties are coalitions. Diverse groups of (yet still further diverse individuals) interests working together to advance more of their agenda then they could with any other likely coalition. Some members of coalitions are loose. That is they cross over frequently to the other side, but remain affiliated with the coalition. Some members are not affiliated, but justed the coalition just because the agenda appealed more (possibly every so slightly more) than the other agenda. Let's also make allowances for external circumstances, such as family party affiliation, past party affiliation, geography, and so forth. The more you look into it, the more parties are just vessels for interests to organize and have no particular ideology themselves. This is one of the reasons that parties can swap ideology.
The social conservative view represented in Power and Control's comments goes on to say, "If you really believe that the Republican Party is a coalition, then I would remind you that coalition partners are in a coalition to further their own interests, not those of their fellow members. And it is very important for you to remember this: if you sacrifice the objectives of one of your constituencies, don't count on that constituency being very committed."
Coalitions who don't cooperate on the interests of other coalition members, but only seek their own agenda are not effective coalitions. Coalition partners who don't understand that they have to compromise with other partners are hurting their coalition. There is no interest that can govern by itself. Only coalitions of interests can govern.
People who put a socially conservative agenda at the top of their concerns are not a majority of the Republican coalition and are a minority of the Democratic coalition. This means they need to comprimise with enough moderates to get something rather than nothing. Its clear that some people would rather get nothing and remain ideologically pure, than to get some thing now and possibly impress a larger number with the success of this policy. Education reform has traditionally be very incremental drawing on the huge numbers of local programs out there. No one gets 100% of what they want in education.
Too many people who share their opinions with a quarter or less of the American people get mad that they can't get their will imposed on the whole country. When people on the other side hear this frustration, or maybe just hear the agenda, come to the conclusion that the "religious right wants to impose its values on the country." The frustrating thing about this is that its the result of people generalizing from a small group of people who don't understand politics.
Parties are effective when they advance a broad agenda with the cooperation of most of the coalition on each point of the agenda.
Monday, November 08, 2004
More Semantics
I see that Mystery Pollster is also dealing with the problem of "Moral Values" as a problem for voting analysis.
I see that Mystery Pollster is also dealing with the problem of "Moral Values" as a problem for voting analysis.
Sunday, November 07, 2004
Semantics
Yesterday [ed. actually this morning, but seperated by eight hours sleep], I wrote about the semantics of the exit polling. Roger L. Simon does the same thing with the semantics of moral vision. Does it mean opposition to gay marriage and stem cell research, or the will to confront terrorism in the Middle East?
Yesterday [ed. actually this morning, but seperated by eight hours sleep], I wrote about the semantics of the exit polling. Roger L. Simon does the same thing with the semantics of moral vision. Does it mean opposition to gay marriage and stem cell research, or the will to confront terrorism in the Middle East?
A Unity Ticket?
Over at Evangelical Outpost, Joe Carter is discussing Kerry's attempts to woo McCain. Most of the comments section rejects the notion as impractical. For a unity ticket to work, its actually got to be a unity ticket, not just window dressing. Cabinet appointments must either cross the political spectrum or concentrate on the center right and center left, draw from both parties, and generally reach deeply into both parties.
Consider the following scenario. After 9-11, the administration, which had already hung on to several Clinton appointees, including Clark, consults with top Democrats like Lieberman, Biden, Breaux, and others to fill out vacant spots in the administration. In December, when Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neal leaves, a fiscally conservative Democrat is selected. A "Scoop Jackson" Democrat is selected to head up Homeland Security. Before the primary pre-season begins, Bush reaches out to Lieberman and plans are made to run a Bush-Lieberman ticket of national unity. The Democrats run some anti-war candidates, but a lot of Dems support the unity ticket. This would increase the 1864 parallels.
Would such a scenario have been better? Who knows, but as far as viable unity tickets are concerned, they require this level of bipartisanship.
Over at Evangelical Outpost, Joe Carter is discussing Kerry's attempts to woo McCain. Most of the comments section rejects the notion as impractical. For a unity ticket to work, its actually got to be a unity ticket, not just window dressing. Cabinet appointments must either cross the political spectrum or concentrate on the center right and center left, draw from both parties, and generally reach deeply into both parties.
Consider the following scenario. After 9-11, the administration, which had already hung on to several Clinton appointees, including Clark, consults with top Democrats like Lieberman, Biden, Breaux, and others to fill out vacant spots in the administration. In December, when Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neal leaves, a fiscally conservative Democrat is selected. A "Scoop Jackson" Democrat is selected to head up Homeland Security. Before the primary pre-season begins, Bush reaches out to Lieberman and plans are made to run a Bush-Lieberman ticket of national unity. The Democrats run some anti-war candidates, but a lot of Dems support the unity ticket. This would increase the 1864 parallels.
Would such a scenario have been better? Who knows, but as far as viable unity tickets are concerned, they require this level of bipartisanship.
Arlen Specter
I've always liked Arlen Specter. Once again, conservatives far enough to the right to find Specter unacceptable are attempting to derail him. Those conservatives don't have the votes or the public support to govern. Nominating Federal judges that don't get confirmed is a form of fetishism. Todd Zywicki, over at The Volokh Conspiracy, argues that these nominations are a zero sum game, and that moderate appointments don't change the calculus. Maybe, but continuing to nominate very conservative judges won't change that, but probabaly reinforces the zero sum mentality. As Infidel Cowboy argues, the difference between the two parties' vote totals are too close, and the strength of the hard right too small to try and govern from the right.
I am glad to see Hugh Hewitt takes a similar line.
I've always liked Arlen Specter. Once again, conservatives far enough to the right to find Specter unacceptable are attempting to derail him. Those conservatives don't have the votes or the public support to govern. Nominating Federal judges that don't get confirmed is a form of fetishism. Todd Zywicki, over at The Volokh Conspiracy, argues that these nominations are a zero sum game, and that moderate appointments don't change the calculus. Maybe, but continuing to nominate very conservative judges won't change that, but probabaly reinforces the zero sum mentality. As Infidel Cowboy argues, the difference between the two parties' vote totals are too close, and the strength of the hard right too small to try and govern from the right.
I am glad to see Hugh Hewitt takes a similar line.
Positivism
This philosophy has been my central area of study for a year or so now. I find its ideas throughout the modern world, depite the explicit fall of Positivism in the middle of the last century. Whether its the influence of Positivism in education, or technocracy as a form of stasism, I think its not only one of the fundamental ideological positions presently, but has been since its articulation nearly two hundred years ago. Any number of people, like Virginia Postrel, argue that its not about right and left, but identifies dynamists, reactionaries, and technocrats. If I were to rename these groups Enlightenment liberals, reactionaries, and positivists, I think it becomes obvious that this isn't a post-Cold War innovation.
This philosophy has been my central area of study for a year or so now. I find its ideas throughout the modern world, depite the explicit fall of Positivism in the middle of the last century. Whether its the influence of Positivism in education, or technocracy as a form of stasism, I think its not only one of the fundamental ideological positions presently, but has been since its articulation nearly two hundred years ago. Any number of people, like Virginia Postrel, argue that its not about right and left, but identifies dynamists, reactionaries, and technocrats. If I were to rename these groups Enlightenment liberals, reactionaries, and positivists, I think it becomes obvious that this isn't a post-Cold War innovation.
The More Important Issue: Iraq or Terrorism
I have seen pundits discussing the issue of how the answer this question correlated with voting preference. I think the question is false because of problems of defenition. Those who saw Iraq as a seperate issue also saw it as a problem with Bush. Those who saw Iraq as part of a broader war on terror, and so said Terrorism, were more accepting of the dificulties which accompany warfare, and favored the President.
I have seen pundits discussing the issue of how the answer this question correlated with voting preference. I think the question is false because of problems of defenition. Those who saw Iraq as a seperate issue also saw it as a problem with Bush. Those who saw Iraq as part of a broader war on terror, and so said Terrorism, were more accepting of the dificulties which accompany warfare, and favored the President.
I got busy, I got election fatigue, I was gone for forty days and forty nights.
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